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Fictionalism, Semantics,
and Ontology
Gordon Michael Purves

Sacred Heart University

This article expands upon the argument of a previous work which defended a
variational account of scientific fictions. Speciﬁcally, I show that this understanding of scientific ﬁctions can provide guidance for realist interpretations of
scientific theories and models. Depending on a model’s variational properties,
different ontological commitments are appropriate, providing a principled way
for a realist to moderate her views according to the structural properties of a
given model. This reasoning is then applied the Lee-Yang theory and KuboMartin-Schwinger statistics, two foundational models in quantum statistical
mechanics. The Lee-Yang theory is analyzed in a way that permits a robust
realist interpretation, whereas KMS statistics is shown to involve a use of ﬁctions
that shields the theory from conﬁrmation and makes it inappropriate for strongly
realist interpretation, without contradicting broadly realist commitments.
1. Introduction

In a previous article (Purves 2013), I argued that some recent philosophical
work on the use of ﬁctions in science (for instance, Winsberg 1999, 2003;
Teller 2009; Morgan and Morrison 1999; Giere 2010) is, while illuminating about some aspects of current scientiﬁc practice, unduly limited to
cases of well-established ﬁctions. In other words, this earlier work contended, a philosophical account of scientiﬁc ﬁctions can do more than
merely describe scientiﬁc practices, but can aid in the resolution of disputes about the proper interpretation of scientiﬁc theories and the epistemic status of some scientiﬁc models. In the present paper, I expand
upon the variational account of ﬁctions and idealizations proposed in that
earlier work in order to offer an analysis of theory conﬁrmation in a context
of scientiﬁc ﬁctions, and to discuss the implications this account of conﬁrmation has for the interpretation of scientiﬁc theories. More speciﬁcally,
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I will use this account of ﬁctions to specify what may (or may not) be an
appropriate commitment for realist interpretations of scientiﬁc models. As
a result, certain “problem cases” for the realist may be disposed of as being
inappropriate for a realist interpretation, or as being appropriate for at
most a modest, partial, or structural realist interpretation, without challenging the realist program more generally.
To demonstrate the use of this interpretive framework, I will then apply
these ideas to certain models of phase change in quantum statistical mechanics (QSM). Without question, QSM has enjoyed substantial empirical
success. Nonetheless, several models in QSM may prove difﬁcult for a realist to interpret. I will show that, granting the present account of ﬁctions,
the empirical success is not a sufﬁcient condition for claiming that a realist
must be able to provide an ontological story about the model’s success.
Indeed, I will show in the speciﬁc case of the Kubo-Martin-Schwinger
model of the ferromagnetic-paramagnetic phase transition that the structure of the model suggests that a strict realist (and even, perhaps, a structural realist) interpretation is empirically inappropriate for the model in a
way that need not make it a counterinstance for the realist (or structural
realist) agenda more broadly.
2. Fictions and Monotonicity

The idea that science frequently and productively involves the use of various entities and methods termed ‘ﬁctions’ is not a new one, dating back at
least to suggestions of the early positivists and, most explicitly, Hans
Vahinger’s The Philosophy of ‘As If ’. Debate on the existence and nature
of scientiﬁc ﬁctions has recently seen a resurgence among researchers
studying models and simulations. My earlier work (Purves 2013) argued
in favor of an epistemically normative approach to the study of ﬁctions to
complement earlier work that focused on describing how scientists use
those entities that the community of researchers agrees are ﬁctional. Instead, I present an analysis of ﬁctions as a particular type of false posits that
can be used in the construction of a model, to be juxtaposed against idealization and approximation.1
In this earlier work, I proposed that we can understand ﬁctions against
the contrast class of idealizations, which may be thought of as another type
of strictly false posit in a model. More speciﬁcally, I proposed that these
1. There is nothing in my account that necessarily limits ﬁctionality to simply a single
posit or element of a model, and it seems plausible to say that sets of posits and whole
models may be ﬁctions as well. Nonetheless, for simplicity I will ignore this from here
on, and simply state at the outset that everything I have to say about individual posits
applies equally well to sets of posits and to whole models.
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two types of false posits may be differentiated by their variational properties.2 The central idea here is that we don’t just look at a single use of a
single model. Rather, we should look at how a model’s accuracy changes as
a posit is modiﬁed in different ways. (For my purposes, a posit may be
thought of as any individually variable part of a model, that is, any part
of the model that can be replaced so as to produce another intelligible
model. As a result, any conjunction of posits will necessarily be a posit.)
Following Laymon (1987, 1989), I characterize idealizations as those
posits in a speciﬁc model, which in principle may be made more realistic3
or replaced with more realistic alternatives that would make the model
more accurate. More speciﬁcally, they are posits for which all determinately
more realistic alternatives (granting that it may not be clear in some cases,
either because of computational intractability or expressive opacity) produce models that are more accurate. In this way, we can make sense of
an idealization of something, or an idealized representation of a part of a
physical system, insofar as there is (presumably) some “most realistic”
alternative to the idealization that the idealization is really an idealization
of. One would commonly say, then, that the idealization is a “true enough”
version of the fully un-idealized posit for some given purpose.
Fictions, on the other hand, cannot be justiﬁed as being a “true enough”
representation of some part of a system. Fictions are elements of a model
that work in spite of their falsehoods. Thus, ﬁctions are those posits that
are false in such a way that there is some variation or alternative that could
replace it in the model that is, taken independently of the context of the particular model in question, a more realistic representation of the part of the
physical system that is the prima facie representational target of both posits,
but which nonetheless causes the model as a whole to become less accurate.
Since ﬁctional and idealized models should obviously be interpreted differently,
2. The relationship between the terms “ﬁction” and “idealization” is far from uniform.
Some authors consider ﬁctions to be a type of idealization others view idealizations as a
type of ﬁction still others use the terms interchangeably. Nothing in particular rests on this
semantic point, and so for simplicity I will treat ﬁctions and idealizations as two different
types of false posits. Similar semantic differences arise with regards to whether an entire
model is a ﬁction or an idealization, or just a part. Since I am interested in the parts of
models, my convention is to treat ﬁctions as parts of models, though again the difference is
merely semantic and nothing rests on it other than simplicity of expression.
3. It is, of course, no trivial task to specify fully what is meant by a more or less realistic
posit. Part of the reason, I think, is because there is not a general sense of realism that can
be applied in all situations. Rather than being diverted into a much longer discussion of
various theories of approximate truth, all that need be granted for the present discussion is
that there are some cases where one posit is more realistic than another, even if there are
some posits that cannot be properly compared. As a result, there may be some situations
where the interpretive framework present here does not fully or clearly apply.
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we can see that—at least in those models for which this account can unambiguously be applied—the variational properties of a model can provide
some illumination about which interpretations of a model are acceptable
and which are inappropriate for the model.
An important consequence of this account is that a posit is only determinately ﬁctional or nonﬁctional relative to the context of a speciﬁc model,
i.e., relative to its conjunction with a speciﬁc set of other elements of a
model, other posits, assumptions, theories, etc. So, a posit (or a set of
posits, or a model) is ﬁctional just in case there is a more realistic alternative that can replace it that yields a model with worse predictions, explanations, or descriptions. A posit is an idealization just in case all more
realistic alternatives produce more accurate predictions. This contextuality
leaves open the possibility that a posit may be ﬁctional in one model, but
that the very same posit could be nonﬁctional in another model, even
another model that is describing many of the same physical processes,
should the other assumptions being made and modelling elements adopted
allow for the consistent improvability of the former ﬁction. We can also now
see the sense in which a posit’s ﬁctionality is variational and structural:
ﬁctionality arises from how the accuracy of our predictions and descriptions changes as a posit varies across a range of possibilities, not from
any intrinsic property of a particular model or element of a model, nor
from any property of the community of researchers using a model. (That
having been said, how a community of researches treats a model, modelling method, or model element will often be a reliable indicator of these
structural properties.) Fictionality is thus a property born by a posit due to
the relationship between the predictions and descriptions that can be made
by a model incorporating it and those of the models that are identical (as
much as possible), except that the posit in question is replaced with others
that are more realistic.
It is also worth noting that this deﬁnition of a ﬁction is, in a certain
sense, a success condition: ﬁctions are those posits or elements of a model
that are able to provide more accurate predictions than some more realistic
alternatives. In most cases, then, one would need a detailed epistemology
of the speciﬁc case study to determine which elements of a particular model
are ﬁctional. As a result, we will not always have access to the empirical facts
necessary to directly test a posit’s ﬁctionality, especially in situations where
the model is being used to study phenomena to which we have no empirical
access, as is often the case. To address this fully would take us far from the
focus of the present project, so I will only brieﬂy gesture towards Winsberg’s
(1999, 2003, 2010) excellent work on calibration and the epistemology of
simulations. The idea, in brief, is that we may relatively safely infer that a
posit will produce accurate predictions and descriptions when used in a
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model describing systems to which we do not have empirical access if it does
so in other similar models describing phenomena we can actually test (either
experimentally or through the use analytic calculations). Thus, we may infer
from the fact that an element of a model is successfully ﬁctional in one context (i.e., that it produces good predictions in spite of the fact that worse
predictions result from replacing it with a more realistic alternative) to a
similar success in another context. Of course, such an inference is far from
certain or easy—as noted above, it is entirely conceivable that something
may be a ﬁction in one model but a nonﬁction in another. This type of
inference will then require an argument that parity holds between the
two uses of the posit.
3. An Epistemology of Falsehoods

The fact that science uses ﬁctions and idealizations (and the fact that they
are pervasive in almost all branches of science) raises some immediate
problems for a theory of conﬁrmation. As Cartwright famously argued
(Cartwright 1983, pp. 100–27), the fact that idealizations and ﬁctions4
are generally necessary to be able to derive any descriptions of concrete
phenomena from general theories means that those theories are shielded
from any conﬁrmation or refutation of those phenomena. To see why,
consider a simpliﬁed version of the classic hypothetical-deductive model
of conﬁrmation (Hempel 1945), ignoring for the moment the obvious
problems with that model and focusing instead on the broad picture of
conﬁrmation. According to this model, a hypothesis, H, is conﬁrmed by
observation, O, just in case H (presumably conjoined with a description
of the state of the system under consideration) entails O and O is actually
observed to occur. However, Cartwright argues, if the only way to derive
O from H is to conjoin H with idealizations and ﬁctions, F, then there is
no clear way in which the observation of O is a success for H. After all, if
O were observed to be false, all that would logically entail is that the
conjunction (H & F) is false—which we already knew to be the case.
Given, then, the pervasiveness of ﬁctions and idealizations in model
building, and the fact that they are often necessary for any derivations
to be computationally tractable at all, it seems to follow that the use
of these false posits shield fundamental theories from conﬁrmation or refutation. Thus, “the fundamental laws of physics do not describe true facts
about reality. Rendered as descriptions of facts, they are false; amended to
4. In this early work, Cartwright does not use the language of ﬁctions and is more
focused on explanation than conﬁrmation. However, it seems clear from her later work
and from how the discussion of this problem has progressed over the ensuing decades that
the discussion that follows is a fairly direct consequence of the earlier work.
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be true, they lose their fundamental, explanatory force,” (Cartwright
1983, p. 54). Put another way, Cartwright is arguing against a realist
interpretation of fundamental laws and theories, in favor of a focus on
the phenomenological laws and models that result from incorporating
idealizations and ﬁctions.
A great deal of detail and sophistication has been elided from this
account, as have the vast number of replies that have been proposed. My
point here is neither to provide a complete history of this discussion, nor to
provide a detailed response to Cartwright. My focus, rather, will be to explore whether and when ﬁctions and idealizations, understood variationally
as presented above, shield realistic interpretations of fundamental laws and
theories from conﬁrmation, and when a realist may reasonably take positive
evidence to be conﬁrmatory. As a preliminary note, however, it should be
stressed that the argument that follows is not intended as a defense of scientiﬁc realism. Instead, my goal is to show how the realist may be principled in their response to apparent counterinstances either in treating a
model instrumentally, anti-realistically, phenomenalistically, or in nonetheless claiming that the evidence indirectly supports a general law or
theory. The argument that follows, then, will use the present account
of ﬁctions to show how one may be a principled modest realist about
ﬁctionalized and idealized models.
Presumably, in situations where we may safely assume we are not making use of any ﬁctional or highly idealized posits, successful predictions
conﬁrm (to some degree) the general accuracy of the model’s representation
of the phenomenon of interest (in whatever way one interprets “accuracy”).
In doing so, the conﬁrmation may be said to “trickle down” to conﬁrm
each of the posits in the non-idealized, non-ﬁctional model, and from there
to the theories from which they were derived or which otherwise motivated
them.
The problem, as Cartwright and many others have pointed out, is that
very few models are constructed in this way. Frequently, models are partially composed of ﬁctional or idealized posits, which we obviously will not
want to be conﬁrmable by a successful prediction since we know them to
be false. The account that must be offered in such situations depends crucially on what kind of falsehood is at play. Laymon’s (1987, 1989) account
of theory conﬁrmation provides a blueprint for how to deal with the conﬁrmation of (at least some) models that incorporate idealizations. The basic
idea is that the non-idealized elements of a model are conﬁrmed or disconﬁrmed by comparing empirical evidence to the trend of the predictions
as the idealizations in the model are made more realistic by being de-idealized.
If the predictions would become more accurate or more accurately detailed as
idealizations are made more realistic, and if we have good reasons to suppose
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that this trend would continue beyond the limit of what calculations are
tractable, then we may reasonably take the non-idealized elements to be
conﬁrmed to a certain degree.
A successful series of predictions thus speaks in favor of the model’s
overall representational accuracy—i.e., its empirical adequacy. It shows
that, while the model is not an exact representation of the system under
investigation, it is close and would improve if the idealized parts were deidealized, and thus the non-idealized parts of the model may be lent conﬁrmation by its empirical success. The conﬁrmation, however, should not
extend to all of the different elements of the model in the same way, since
we don’t want to say that a successful prediction indicates that an idealized
posit is an accurate representation of its prima facie target. The clearly nonidealized (and non-ﬁctional) elements are straightforwardly conﬁrmed, and
to a certain degree so are those theories (if any) from which they may be
derived. For the false posits to be idealizations, we must have some good
reasons to think that the model would become more accurate if the idealizations were removed. As a result, the general theories from which the
model elements are derived are not blocked from conﬁrmation completely,
as Cartwright argued. The conﬁrmation suggests that the theories would
provide accurate predictions if applied exactly, were such applications computationally feasible.
The idealized posits themselves, on the other hand, are “conﬁrmed” to
be falsehoods that are representationally useful. This conﬁrmation is, of
course, not directly evidence of the truth of an idealization, but is evidence
that the idealization will sufﬁce in models similar to the one being tested,
that is, that other similar models that incorporate this idealization may
be “true enough” for analogous purposes, and thus would not shield the
rest of the model from conﬁrmation or refutation. In some situations,
though, we may conclude slightly more. If we have good reason to suppose that the idealization may be incrementally made more realistic, and
in doing so we will continue to get incrementally better predictions, we
may, with Laymon, conclude that the posit is properly interpreted as
truth-like. More importantly, we can say that the version of this posit
that is at the end of this process is (to a certain extent) conﬁrmed, even
if that particular model is intractable, and that we may have conﬁdence
that the idealized posit is relevantly similar to its de-idealized cousin. In
this way, conﬁrmation operates in much the same way as the calibration
of computer simulations that Winsberg discusses (1999). Since the idea
here is much the same as that which Winsberg discusses at length,
straightforwardly applied to Laymon’s way of thinking, I will not address
it any further and will, instead, move on to the conﬁrmation of ﬁctional
models.
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The introduction of ﬁctions further complicates a characterization of the
success of a prediction, and the determination of the appropriate epistemic
attitudes that a conﬁrmation may call for. Laymon’s response obviously
will not work here, since by deﬁnition ﬁctions are those posits which
are not improvable in the way necessary for idealized conﬁrmation. It
seems just as clear, however, that we do not want all models that incorporate what Laymon terms “non-monotonically improvable” posits to be
treated on the same level. Consider, by way of example, the method of
image charges in classical electrodynamics.
A simple example of the use of this method involves a single charged
particle, say a positively charged ion, next to a large conductive plate. The
ion will induce a charge in the conductive plate by pulling the electrons in
the plate towards it (and to a much lesser extent pushing the positively
charged nuclei away), and leaving the region near it on the plate with a
net negative charge. The exact details of this phenomenon are incredibly
complex, since in principle the electric ﬁeld from the ion extends inﬁnitely,
and thus the electric ﬁeld will exert a force on every charged particle in
the plate. The model quickly and predictably becomes intractable when
one attempts to incorporate the effects on and from each of these charged
particles.
The method of image charges can step in, however, and accurately
model the behavior of the electric ﬁeld around the plate. This comes in
two stages. First, it models the large conductive plate as though it were
inﬁnite and the charged particle as though it were a point charge. Both of
these adjustments are well understood as idealizations—inﬁnite plates are
reasonably accurate models of ﬁnite plates, but are computationally much
more tractable, and gradually easing off from the inﬁnite limit by looking
at very large ﬁnite plates (i.e., much larger than the one in the system
under consideration), though less tractable, would produce a more accurate
approximation, and similarly for giving a point charge’s extension. Thus, two
idealizations replace two posits of our model. Second, this idealized model
is ﬁctionalized. According to an analytic uniqueness theorem, the induced
electric ﬁeld of a point charge near an inﬁnite plate is identical to that
produced by a ﬁctional particle on the opposite side of the plate. This particle, the image charge or mirror charge, is an exact duplicate of the ion,
except that it has the opposite charge and its position mirrors that of the
original charged particle on the opposite side of the plate.
What is interesting about this model, for present purposes, is that there
is a rigorous mathematical proof showing that the image charge generates
the exact same electric charge as the inﬁnite conductive plate would have,
were it computationally possible to directly calculate it, and thus the interaction between the charged particle and the plate is identical in many
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respects to that between the charged particle and the image charge. Moreover, were we to try to make the image charge incrementally more realistic
(say, by splitting the negative charge amongst several smaller particles, and
spreading them slightly across the surface, or bringing the charge closer to
the face of the plate, etc.), we would immediately end up with much worse
predictions, and thus the image charge ﬁts the variational deﬁnition of a
ﬁction outlined above. However, given that the uniqueness theorem guarantees that this model would behave identically to a highly accurate idealized model, it seems odd to say, following Cartwright, that the practical
necessity of the use of a ﬁction here is a problem for the theory of classical
electrodynamics, or that the empirical success of using it to model real
physical systems is somehow not a success for that theory.
Indeed, the empirical success of this type of model seems to demonstrate
the power of classical electrodynamics to predict and explain electrical phenomena. The fact that ﬁctions and idealizations were necessary to produce
a tractable phenomenological model ought not to shield the non-ﬁctional
elements from conﬁrmation or disconﬁrmation, at least in this case. This is
because the success of the use of ﬁctions can readily be explained by appeal
to the truth of the underlying theory, through the use of the uniqueness
theorem. I will refer to this kind of ﬁction as an isolated ﬁction, since the
explanation for why we should not be surprised by its success demonstrates
that the ﬁctionality is isolated from the rest of the model, which may thus be
conﬁrmed to a certain degree just as with models involving idealizations.
By the same lights, however, when an explanation of a falsehood’s empirical success by appeal to the truth of the underlying theory is impossible, Cartwright’s argument should convince us that a realist interpretation
of the general laws and theories is problematic. When a theory can only
produce accurate models through the use of ﬁctions, and when those
models’ empirical success cannot be explained by appeal to the truth of
the theory, then the empirical success must be taken to be indicative of
a problem with the underlying theory, and we can conclude that the theory
can at most be interpreted as an empirically adequate ﬁctional representation. In Cartwright’s language, the empirical success only lends credence
to the phenomenological laws that the model generated, rather than to the
abstract general laws that were used in the formation of the model.
This is not to say simply that we lack an explanation of the empirical
success in terms of the truth of the theory, but that no explanation is possible. In other words, whenever a theory’s models only work when they
incorporate ﬁctions, and when the theory in principle cannot explain
why this ﬁction would work in (at least approximately) the same way as
a non-ﬁctional alternative, the theory cannot be judged to be true in realist
terms. Of course, the claim that no explanation is possible if the theory is
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literally true requires a signiﬁcant and nontrivial argument, as well as an
account of what it means to be “literally true.” As we will see below, this
argument will normally come by way of proving, directly or by taking a
limit, or by a parity argument or some other indirect means, that, regardless of how a non-ﬁctional alternative posit would act in the model, it cannot act in the same way as the working ﬁction. This, I think, can be
plausibly taken to be a property that those theories we take to inform
our ontology should not have, and as such, I will refer to these ﬁctions
as disconﬁrming ﬁctions, their empirical success being indicative of the
falsehood of any realist interpretation of the underlying theory.
It is important to be clear exactly what is being disconﬁrmed when a
model incorporates a disconﬁrming ﬁction. Anti-realist, instrumentalist, or
phenomenalist interpretations are still available, of course, since an element of the model can only be a ﬁction if it is to some extent empirically
adequate. What is being disconﬁrmed, rather, is the underlying theory’s
ability to be a true explanation of the phenomena being modeled, as the
realist would understand it. This is not to say that we should throw out the
theory altogether, any more than we should throw out an outdated but still
useful theory like classical mechanics. After all, the theory was still able to
be used to generate an empirically accurate ﬁctionalized model. Rather, as
we will see below when discussing a disconﬁrming ﬁction in the ﬁeld of
quantum statistical mechanics, the appropriate epistemic attitude in these
cases is to acknowledge an open scientiﬁc question about why, in this case,
a problematic theory is able to provide accurate descriptions or predictions.
Depending on how this question can be answered, the false explanation
that the disconﬁrming ﬁction offered may ﬁt into a broader account of
the phenomenon of interest and the role of the problematized theory in
explanations of it.
The types of ﬁctions considered thus far have all required a clear and full
understanding of the model under consideration, but this will obviously
not always be the case. On the one hand, it may not be obvious whether a
falsehood is a ﬁction or an idealization. Similarly, and more interesting for
present purposes, a theory may be generally intractable and so it may be
uncertain whether there is a ready explanation for a falsehoods’ success that
appeals to the truth of the theory, or there may be no explanation for the
falsehood’s success at all. In the former situation, we would not be in a
position to judge how the model’s descriptions and predictions would fare
were the ﬁction replaced with a more realistic posit. This could arise if we
have access to enough of the variational properties of a posit to identify it
as a ﬁction (i.e., we at least suspect that there is at least one more realistic
alternative that provides worse predictions), but not enough to determine
how the results would compare to those of a model that instead used an

62

Fictionalism, Semantics, Ontology

ideally realistic posit in the ﬁction’s place.5 The success of the predictions
that are generated by these ﬁctions cannot be separated from the ﬁctions
themselves, just as with disconﬁrming ﬁctions, but not because of any
determinate variational property. Rather, we cannot separate success from
ﬁctionality because of our limited understanding of the ﬁctions’ variational
behavior. Since we cannot isolate these ﬁctions, any ontological conclusions
would be highly tentative, and certainly not evidentially supported. However, unlike with disconﬁrming ﬁctions, we are not in a position to judge
that an anti-realist interpretation is thus best, and should instead take the
empirical success to indicate that the model (at least in this context) is at
least empirically adequate.
Further investigation, either through the construction of better tools
granting new empirical access to the relevant phenomena, the discovery
of new analytic solutions to the theory’s equations, or the development
of better computation and simulation techniques, may yet resolve the
uncertainty, but our present knowledge is insufﬁcient to do so. The best
epistemic attitude, then, is a degree of epistemic caution. Were they
optimistic, a realist may tentatively investigate how the world would be
if the ﬁction turned out to be isolated (or isolatable). If, on the other hand,
they were more pessimistic, a realist may look outside the theory for an
explanation for the phenomena and, possibly, an external account of why
the model works, to the extent that it does, though such a search is not
demanded by the model’s success as is the case with disconﬁrming ﬁctions.
Since these falsehoods fail to recommend a particular epistemic attitude,
I term them indeterminate ﬁctions.
I have here spelled out ﬁve different interpretations that may be given
for the empirical success of a model, depending on whether it includes any
false posits, and what kinds they are. A model that includes no idealizations or ﬁctions will simply be conﬁrmed by its accurate predictions, and
that conﬁrmation will trickle down to each posit and any theories that
generated it. An empirically successful model that incorporates clear idealizations permits a realist interpretation. The underlying theories and
modeling assumptions are conﬁrmed, and if the idealization may be reasonably supposed to continue to yield more accurate predictions as it is deidealized, then so is a fully de-idealized version. A model that includes an
isolated ﬁction may be fully conﬁrmed, allowing a realist interpretation,
5. I am using language here of a set of posits that vary with respect to their realism
continuously, though in many cases such language will make no sense. The existence of a
continuum from the more realistic to the less is not necessary for the present argument,
though I am here mostly concerned with asymptotic behavior, for which at least poset
ordering is necessary.
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though the ﬁction itself can at most be empirically adequate. The whole of
a model that uses a disconﬁrming ﬁction, on the hand, can at most be empirically adequate, and we should be hesitant to attempt any ontological
interpretation of the underlying theory. Finally, the empirical success of a
model that uses an indeterminate ﬁction indicates that the model is at least
empirically adequate, while remaining silent about whether a realist interpretation is allowable, though permitting tentative explorations of both
possibilities.
This division between types of ﬁction may be used to analyze some scientiﬁc model-building practices which utilize what are usually thought of
as highly idealized assumptions, assumptions which are particularly far
from the truth. I will restrict myself for the remainder of the present work
to the use of the thermodynamic limit in derivations of phase transitions,
with a particular focus on the ferromagnetic-paramagnetic transition.
Speciﬁcally, I will argue in the next section that, in the case of the
Kubo-Martin-Schwinger theory of phase transitions, the thermodynamic
limit acts as a disconﬁrming ﬁction, requiring a radical reimagining of realist interpretations of quantum statistical accounts of these phenomena.
This will be true even though, in classic statistical mechanics, the thermodynamic limit is able to act as a straightforward idealization, with all of
the interpretive freedom that entails.
4. Quantum Statistics and the Thermodynamic Limit

Quantum statistical mechanics (QSM) is the ﬁeld that attempts to rectify
the apparent disconnect between how our microscopic and macroscopic
theories describe the world. Speciﬁcally, QSM is the study of emergent
quantum phenomena, including solid state physics, quantum thermodynamics, and changes of state and phase. As such, just like its classical
counterpart, it is an attempt to use the theory of the very small to describe
certain observable macroscopic phenomena. In this section, I will brieﬂy
examine the use of a central model-building assumption known as the
thermodynamic assumption or the thermodynamic limit in a few QSM
models. The thermodynamic limit describes the practice of treating systems that are in fact composed of a very large but ﬁnite number
(∼1023) of distinct particles as though they were composed of an inﬁnite
number of particles while maintaining a ﬁnite energy density in the composite system. In many theoretical contexts, such as in classical statistical
explanations of phenomena like the smoothness of pressure on a boundary surface, the limit is a fairly straightforward example of an idealization in the sense described above: it simpliﬁes calculations that are
otherwise intractable but which we have good reason to suppose would
monotonically improve if it were computationally possible to ease away
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from the limit. However, that the thermodynamic limit constitutes an idealization in these contexts is, without some further argument, not a sufﬁcient
reason to suppose that it will work as an idealization, or even an isolated ﬁction, in others. Conversely, of course, that the limit is strictly false in some
model is not a sufﬁcient reason to reject it or conclude that it is of merely
instrumental value.6 In this section, I will demonstrate that the thermodynamic limit is a disconﬁrming ﬁction in at least one model in quantum
statistical mechanics, and that thus QSM ought not to be given a realist
interpretation – or, at least, its explanation of the phenomenon in question,
the existence of multiple equilibrium states during phase transition, ought
not to be given a realist interpretation; and we have some reason to be skeptical of realist interpretations of other QSM models.
Much of the motivation for the thermodynamic assumption in this context
comes from the difﬁculty of modeling phenomena such as phase transitions
as quantum systems. Consider, by way of example, the transition from the
ferromagnetic state to the paramagnetic state of iron (for detailed explanations
of this phenomenon, see Ruelle 2004, pp. 1–22; Sewell 2002, pp. 15–8; for a
more philosophical discussion, see Reutsche 2006). Below 771°C, iron (like
other ferromagnetic materials below their own Curie temperatures) behaves in
exactly the way we are all familiar, with a magnetic polarization. At higher
temperatures, however, this polarization is washed out by thermodynamic effects. The shift from the lower temperature region to the higher temperature
region corresponds to the shift from the ferromagnetic state to the paramagnetic state. This phenomenon has been well known and mathematically described for over a hundred years; nevertheless, as it turns out, providing a
robust theoretical explanation for it has proven more difﬁcult.
On a microscopic (and somewhat simplistic) level, the two phases can
be fairly intuitively understood. Each atom in a piece of iron has a non-zero
net magnetism (it has an unﬁlled electron shell, so the dipole magnetic
moments of the up spin electrons do not exactly cancel out that of the
down spin electrons). Each atom exerts a force on its neighbors pushing
it to anti-align, just as two magnets next to each other will push their
negative ends to be next to their neighbors’ positive ends. At fairly low
temperatures and relatively high densities (such as room temperature
and pressure), this tendency will be dominated by a phenomenon called
6. Robinson (1994, pp. 84–9), for example, has argued in the context of the second and
more interesting case study considered here that the thermodynamic assumption is false in
ordinary quantum mechanics, and along with the fact that ordinary quantum mechanics is
very highly conﬁrmed he concludes that the assumption is illegitimate. My point here is
that, though I agree with most of Robinson’s conclusions, some further argument is necessary to demonstrate that the falsehood in fact closes off the possibility of answering foundational or ontological questions.
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the exchange interaction. The basic idea of this interaction is that, when
the orbitals of valence electrons overlap in a molecule, the lowest energy
state of the two-electron system occurs when they are “farthest apart.”7
Because of the magnetic push, this means that the system is in the lowest
energy state when the dipoles are aligned, with positive ends next to
positive ends and negative ends next to negative ends. The result is the
ferromagnetic state: most of the valence electrons, and thus the atoms they
are a part of, have aligned dipole moments, and so the piece of iron as a
whole has a nontrivial net magnetic dipole moment and the whole piece of
iron is magnetic. If the temperature is signiﬁcantly increased, however,
thermal collisions between the atoms will increase, allowing the valence electrons to rise to higher energy states. Consequently, the macroscopically more
normal tendency of dipoles to anti-align (as they do in non-ferromagnetic
substances) with near neighbors will again become dominant, and so the
overall net dipole moment will move to very near zero, and the iron enters
the paramagnetic state.
While this description fairly accurately captures the differences between
the two equilibrium states and their respective microscopic causes, it fails
to explain the sharpness of the threshold between them, or the details of a
transition between a ferromagnetic state and a paramagnetic state, specifically the point where the two phases meet and overlap. The thermodynamic limit arises in attempts to deal with both of these problems:
the sharpness of the threshold and macroscopic details of the point of contact between the two equilibrium states. I will only brieﬂy address the statistical theory that deals with the former, the Lee-Yang theory, in order to
introduce some key concepts, and then will focus on Kubo-MartinSchwinger statistics, which addresses the fact that, during a phase change,
two distinct equilibrium states can coexist.
Thermodynamics dictates that a pointlike phase change can only occur
when there is a discontinuity in the free energy of the system, or one of its
derivatives (for a good introduction to the Lee-Yang theory, see Blythe and
Evans 2003). As such, a statistical explanation of the threshold phase change
must begin by giving a reductive redeﬁnition of the free energy of a system in
terms of the properties of its microscopic constituents. The most natural way to
do this is by making the free energy a function of the partition function. For
instance, the Helmholtz free energy is given by:
A ¼ −kB T lnZ
7. This is, of course, at best metaphorical, since the exchange interaction is a purely
quantum mechanical phenomenon. More literally, the expectation value of the positions
of the electrons are farther apart.
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where kB is Boltzmann’s constant, T is the temperature, and the partition
function, Z, is a sum over the microstates with energy Er:
Z¼

X

exp

−Er
:
kB T

Since Z is a ﬁnite sum of analytic functions, and the free energy is an analytic
function of Z, the free energy will also be analytic so neither it nor its derivatives can have any discontinuities. As such, if this were the end of the story, no
phase transition would be theoretically possible because, again, phase changes
can only occur when there is a discontinuity in the free energy or one of its
derivatives. If we take the thermodynamic limit, however, then the sum
becomes inﬁnite and the partition function need not be analytic, since an inﬁnite sum of analytic functions is not necessarily analytic. The Lee-Yang theory
demonstrates that, in this limit the partition function, Z, can and does have
discontinuities, and thus permits phase transitions.
The Lee-Yang theory demonstrates that threshold phase transitions can
exist in the thermodynamic limit, and can differentiate between threshold
transitions and non-threshold transitions, but it does not directly account
for the fact that for a system to transition from one distinct phase to
another, the two unique phases must, and empirically do, coexist at the
transition point, regardless of whether the transition is sharp or gradual.8
To understand how the thermodynamic limit arises in response to this
problem, we must ﬁrst address the statistical mechanical characterization
of an equilibrium state, what is called a Gibbs state. A Gibbs state is a
probability distribution over the microstates of a system that remains unchanged under all possible dynamic evolutions of the constituent microsystems. If a Gibbs state exists for a ﬁnite system at a particular temperature,
therefore, it is necessarily unique. The basic idea is easy to grasp, and a detailed proof would distract from the topic at hand and is addressed more
than adequately elsewhere (for the classic form of this argument, see Ruelle
2004). If a system is in a Gibbs state, then this says that for all possible
dynamical transformations, the system will remain in the same state. Since
8. It is important to note that this problem cannot simply be solved by recognizing that
a real bar of iron at 771°C will have some portions that are slightly above that point—and
thus will be paramagnetic—and some that will be below—and thus ferromagnetic. The
reason this cannot be the answer is twofold. First, coexistence is necessary for there to be
a transition from one phase to the other, so saying that, in the transition of a large macroscopic system there are some parts that undergo the transition before others doesn’t explain how the transition occurs. Second, even if as an empirical matter we cannot have a
macroscopic system with a completely homogenous temperature, as a theoretical matter
there is a determinate temperature for each part of the system, and so some will be at
the threshold where the two phases must be allowed.
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the set of possible dynamics is the set of possible paths through the microscopic state space, this implies that every point in the state space accessible
from our initial state has a probability distribution equivalent to (or vanishingly similar to) that of the Gibbs state it started in. Thus, what it is to be
an equilibrium state of a closed ﬁnite system (i.e., an equilibrium state of a
system with set parameters such as temperature, pressure, volume, etc.) requires that no other equilibrium state be coexistent. In other words, if a
system is in one Gibbs state that means that no other Gibbs state is accessible to it, since, by deﬁnition, if it were then either it would have the same
probability distribution (and thus would be the same Gibbs state), or it
would have a different probability distribution (in which case it was not
in a Gibbs state to begin with).
While this description sufﬁces for the pure paramagnetic phase and the
pure ferromagnetic phase, it also illustrates why the theory of Gibbs states
cannot describe the phase transition between the two. Indeed, the theory of
Gibbs states seems to say that no phase transitions are possible, since a
phase transition just is a transition from one equilibrium state to another,
which was just demonstrated to be impossible. Equivalently, the theory of
Gibbs states cannot hold at the phase transition point (771°C), at which
both paramagnetic and ferromagnetic equilibrium states are possible.9 (If
this seems strange, consider a glass of ice water – it is at a temperature of
0°C, the transition point between solid and liquid water, where both solid
and liquid equilibrium states thus are simultaneously present.)
If we shift to an inﬁnite system, however, it turns out that the plurality
of equilibrium states needed to account for the phenomenon of phase transition becomes possible, though, since Gibbs states are only deﬁned for
ﬁnite systems, a new theory of equilibrium states will be needed. That
need can be ﬁlled by the theory of Kubo-Martin-Schwinger (KMS) states,
a more general analogue to the theory of Gibbs states. Without getting
overly distracted by the technical details, KMS states are unitarily equivalent probability density matrices (as opposed to probability distributions
over phase space), and equilibrium states are identiﬁed with extremal disjoint KMS states that remain unchanged up to unitary equivalence under
all dynamical evolutions. For ﬁnite systems, KMS equilibrium states are
equivalent to Gibbs states, and thus also fail to offer any explanation
of the phenomenon of phase transition. If, however, we transition to
9. In point of fact, there is not an exact transition point where both equilibrium states
coexist; rather there is a small range centered around 771°C within which both equilibrium
states coexist. The point is simply that there is an observed phenomenon—the coexistence of
two equilibrium states—that is in need of explanation where none can be provided by the
theory of Gibbs states. The apparent conﬂict between this range and the Lee-Yang theory
discussed above will be brieﬂy explored at the end of this work.
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the thermodynamic limit (possible for the KMS theory, though not for
the Gibbs theory), then superpositions of extremal disjoint KMS states
become possible, and the phenomenon of coexisting equilibrium states
at a phase transition point seems to be saved. As a result, “this idealization [i.e., the thermodynamic limit] is necessary because only inﬁnite
systems exhibit sharp phase transitions” (Ruelle 2004, p. 1).
To illustrate why this is the case, consider a KMS description of the
possible states of a ferromagnetic system. Let us begin by idealizing (in
the strict sense deﬁned earlier) in the following ways. First, we will consider only the interactions between the valance electrons, as, through the
exchange interaction, they are the greatest determinant of the magnetic
moment of the system. Second, we will suppose that the iron atoms are
only at the nodes of a three dimensional lattice, ignoring the slight variations in density. Finally, assume that each of the atoms are describable by
a representation of the canonical commutation relations (CCR) for spinhalf particles with the added condition that the spins of different sites
on the lattice intercommute. (This additional condition is not an idealization as I have deﬁned it, since the failure of atoms to intercommute is exactly what drives the exchange interaction and, thus, ferromagnetic
behavior. This is unproblematic because we are only using it to be able
to construct a representation of a particular state of the system as a whole,
and not its dynamics. In the language outlined above, this posit is an isolated ﬁction, and thus doesn’t affect the interpretation of the rest of the
model.)
Initially restricting ourselves just to ﬁnite systems, consider two different
representations, S(+) and S(−), of this lattice of spin-half particles (Reutsche
2006). S(+) begins with every particle in the z-spin-up state and then
switches a ﬁnite number of them into the z-spin-down state. If the system
is right at the phase change temperature, then the “push” towards aligned
dipoles by way of the exchange interaction will be exactly balanced by the
amount of thermal energy available to raise the electrons to the more compact anti-aligned dipole arrangement. As such, since the system is ﬁnite, any
possible conﬁguration of spin-up and spin-down states of the constituents is
possible and thus any possible net magnetization could emerge. Analogously, S(−) begins with every particle in the spin-down state and then
switches a ﬁnite number to spin-up, and can similarly account for every
possible micro- and macro-state. What is important here is that these
are equivalent representations. They are both representations because the
algebraic properties (captured by the CCR and the additional intercommutation condition) are readily met by any given basis of S(+) or S(−). More
importantly, they are unitarily equivalent because all of the physical properties of a system in S(+) could be had by a system in S(−), which is trivially
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true because the two representations span the same states. Again, however,
neither of these representations can capture the physics of the change of
state that occurs at 771°C, since there will always be a determinate magnetization at any given temperature.
If we now take the two representations to the thermodynamic limit, we
ﬁnd that the representations become unitarily inequivalent. S(+) is now an
inﬁnite lattice of spin-half particles, all but a ﬁnite number of which are
spin-up in the z-direction, and conversely for S(−). They are both still representations, for it is still a simple matter to construct operators for which
the CCR and intercommutation condition are still obeyed, so the algebraic
properties of the system are still captured. However, it is just as simple a
matter to show that not all of the same physical properties are possible for
them, most relevantly that every state in S(+) has a net magnetization in the
positive z-direction and every state in S(−) has a net magnetization in the
negative z-direction. There thus is not a unitary map between the two representations, and they are not unitarily equivalent.
The ﬁnal relevant move of this quantum statistical description of Curie’s
law is to recognize that these two inequivalent representations correspond
to two equilibrium KMS states. A probability density matrix may be extracted in the usual way from a description of any state under one or the
other representations, and in the case of inﬁnite systems they will be extremal and, as we’ve just seen, disjointed. S(+) and S(−) are thus two equilibrium
states, namely the two possible z-polarizations in the ferromagnetic state.
The other possible ferromagnetic equilibrium states could be represented
by simply picking a different axis and following the argument to this point
through. Similarly, paramagnetic states could be represented by, e.g., beginning with every other constituent spin-up and the rest spin down, and then
varying a ﬁnite number of them. Finally, these equilibrium states can
co-exist at the same temperature, so long as they are thermodynamically
allowed, because superpositions of thermodynamically distinct equilibrium
states are allowed in the thermodynamic limit. Shy of the thermodynamic
limit, all allowable superpositions are between unitarily equivalent representations of the same equilibrium state. To put things more simply, only in an
inﬁnite system can the paramagnetic and ferromagnetic phases coexist at the
transition point.
5. Quantum Statistical Fictions

So far, so good—we have a model that can adequately capture the empirical fact that, during a phase transition, two different equilibrium
states co-exist. The open question is, given the appeal to the thermodynamic limit, what have we actually demonstrated? This question is especially poignant because this kind of appeal to the thermodynamic limit
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is commonplace in QSM, but the limit is clearly a falsehood—no physical
systems in fact have an inﬁnite number of atoms or molecules. Given the
earlier analysis of the different kinds of falsehoods, ultimately what needs
to be determined is whether, in this case (and cases similar to it in relevant
ways) the thermodynamic limit is an idealization, an isolated ﬁction, a disconﬁrming ﬁction, or an indeterminate ﬁction.
If the thermodynamic limit were a straightforward idealization, then we
could explain its success in modeling phase change by showing that easing
away from the limit leads to slightly more accurate results (though, presumably, at the cost of tractability, so the demonstration may not come in
the form of actually constructing models shy of the thermodynamic limit,
but instead through arguments by analogy, parity, or demonstrating the
approximation analytically). Derivations of the fundamental thermodynamic relation, dU = TdS − PdV, from statistical mechanical principles,
work in exactly this way. Without going into the details, the relation may
be derived exactly from a microscopic deﬁnition of entropy only if we allow
the number of particles to increase to inﬁnity, but a very similar, and
slightly more accurate result follows from more realistic speciﬁcation of
the number of particles. In such cases, we are free to proffer a loosely realist
interpretation of the model, concluding that the world is similar to the
model, and that if we were to shift away from the thermodynamic limit,
our model would become more and more similar to the world. In the case
of the fundamental thermodynamic relation, this means that we are free
to take its empirical success to lend credence to the statistical mechanical
explanation of thermodynamic laws.
In the derivation of phase transitions in quantum statistical mechanics,
however, the thermodynamic limit behaves importantly differently. If we
attempt to reverse the limit, we do not have good reason to think that
we will get similar but more accurate (if less tractable) results. Indeed, we
don’t get similar results at all, since it is only in the limit that two different
equilibrium states can coexist, and thus it is only in the limit that phase
transitions are possible. As a result, we cannot think of the use of the
thermodynamic limit in KMS models of phase transitions as a conceptual
approximation—it must be a kind of ﬁction: an isolated ﬁction, a disconﬁrming ﬁction, or an indeterminate ﬁction.
First, consider whether we should think of the thermodynamic limit as
an isolated ﬁction in KMS models of phase transition. Recall that isolated
ﬁctions are picked out by the ability of the underlying theory to give us a
good reason for supposing that a model that uses the ﬁction will provide
results that are very similar (and thus similarly accurate) to what would be
provided by a model that replaced that ﬁction with an accurate description
of that part of the world. We saw this kind of ﬁction with the method of
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image charges: classical electromagnetism can prove that the image charge
produces exactly the same voltage and magnetic and electric ﬁelds as the
actual induced charge distribution (within the idealization of an inﬁnite
plate and a point charge). However, for the same reason that the thermodynamic limit is not acting as an idealization in KMS models of phase
transitions, it cannot be an isolated ﬁction. No ﬁnite system—whether
large or small, accurate or inaccurate—can have multiple coexisting equilibrium states; only in the limit is the phenomenon saved. We thus have
very good theoretical reasons for thinking that replacing the thermodynamic limit with a realistic number of particles will not produce similar
predictions and descriptions of ferromagnetic systems.
Finally, the ﬁction is not simply an indeterminate ﬁction. It is not the
case that we lack a full understanding of its variational properties. We
know full well that the model cannot account for observed phenomena
without an appeal to the thermodynamic limit. As such, the ﬁction must
be disconﬁrming: the ﬁction plays an essential role in the empirical success
of the model. But, as I argued earlier, a true (or approximately true) model
(as understood by the realist), ought not to have the property of only
providing accurate descriptions when incorporating a falsehood. As such,
the KMS description of ferromagnetic phase transitions (and by parity
other phase transitions as well) does not permit any straightforwardly realist
interpretations.
This is not necessarily to say that it can only be thought of in instrumentalist terms, as a prediction generator. It does imply that we ought to be very
hesitant to draw any ontological or foundational conclusions from its empirical success, but this should not be taken as an edict to re-interpret that empirical success as a theoretical failure. A more nuanced epistemic attitude may
be called for, where the nature of the empirical success is indicative of the
falsehood (in realist terms) of the KMS statistical explanation of phase transition, but does not suggest that that theory is to be rejected in its entirety or
thought of as no more than an approximate generator of phenomenological
laws. The ﬁction is disconﬁrming, in a limited sense, but not necessarily refuting. Rather, it raises a new scientiﬁc question: why is the theory of KMS
statistics able to provide an explanation of phase transitions even though it
does so only by assuming the falsehood of the thermodynamic limit? This
question leaves room for KMS statistics, or some conceptual cousin of it, to
play a role in the ultimate true explanation of phase transition, and also provides a starting point for the investigation into that explanation. In addition
to driving further research by the apparent paradox of its disconﬁrmatory empirical success, that success remains a virtue in its own right, and so it can be
used as a placeholder in other investigations that must make use of an account
of phases, but which themselves are not directly concerned with the nature of
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phase change. In other words, the necessity of the appeal to a disconﬁrming
ﬁction makes the whole of the theory of KMS statistics ﬁctional in the nonpejorative truth-conducive sense that I have been using it, and as such it may
be fruitfully used in other models, so long as care is made to ensure that it
plays the role of an isolated ﬁction in those models. As such, KMS statistics
can play the role of a locally anti-realist theory of phase transition, a theory
that does not match either the physical reality involved or the mathematical
structure of that reality, but which nonetheless can still be used in good
science if one is careful.
Before concluding, it will be worthwhile to return brieﬂy to the use of
the thermodynamic limit in the Lee-Yang theory. Recall that this theory
explains the fact that phase transitions seem to occur at thresholds, and
thus, according to thermodynamics, require a non-analyticity in the free
energy or one of its derivatives. Just like KMS statistics, however, this
non-analyticity can only arise in the thermodynamic limit. We thus have
the exact same problem with the use of the thermodynamic limit as we had
with KMS statistics: only inﬁnite systems can exhibit the kinds of phase
transitions that the Lee-Yang theory is trying to explain, and so the limit is
again a disconﬁrming ﬁction. However, unlike with KMS statistics, we
have another avenue available other than rejecting the ontology of the underlying statistical theory: we can reject the phenomenon to be explained.
Unlike the coexistence of two different equilibrium states at the transition
point, the empirical basis for the claim that the transition occurs at a point
is far less certain. Indeed, there is some empirical support that, slightly
above 771°C, there are some regions that demonstrate ferromagnetic properties mixed into the generally paramagnetic system, and conversely for
slightly below 771°C. Of course, why the transition occurs in a region
surrounding 771°C rather than some other region is still in need of explanation, but we should not be surprised if that explanation does not come
from ﬁnding non-analyticities in the free energy. It is beyond the scope of
the present paper to delve deeply into what kind of an explanation would
work, other than to note that Callender (2001) has made some progress in
a similar direction, arguing that phase transitions occur around points
where there would be a discontinuity in the free energy or one of its derivatives if the system were inﬁnite. More work is needed to show why this
in fact explains the phase transition, but let it sufﬁce as an example of the
kind of project that could ﬁll the gap that I have argued is left by the
interpretive problems surrounding the Lee-Yang theory.
6. Fictional Epistemic Attitudes

I have argued that the use of the thermodynamic limit constitutes a disconﬁrming ﬁction in quantum statistical accounts of phase transitions,
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implying that it cannot be used in a true foundational explanation of that
phenomenon and cannot directly contribute to our understanding of the
connection between microphysics and macrophysics. I would like to conclude now by pointing to two lights at the end of this rather bleak tunnel
(at least, bleak for the realist). Speciﬁcally, I will note that this anti-realism
should be viewed in a highly limited way, which, all things considered, is
not so strange a conclusion to reach when discussing the limits of quantum
mechanics. Moreover, the nature of the foundational failure of the thermodynamic limit can, in fact, shed some light on what type of theoretical
description may not be so ontologically barren.
Quantum mechanics, perhaps more than any other scientiﬁc theory in
history, has been plagued by its refusal to bend to the intuitions we have
gleaned from everyday experiences. Quantum systems frequently cannot be
thought of in the same way we think about those objects with which we
are more intimately familiar. It is in part for this very reason that there is
an open project of attempting to interpret the quantum formalism. I have
here argued that such an interpretive project is a lost cause within the subﬁeld of quantum statistical mechanics,10 that the nature of its success is
such that it must sacriﬁce a claim to be a description of the inner workings
of our universe, if we are to understand those claims in an ontologically
robust way. As I hope this discussion has established, however, this does
not necessarily mean that QSM cannot play a role in good scientiﬁc practice, merely that its use is highly limited and that care is needed whenever
it is used.
No amount of argument, no matter how subtle, can deny that the success of QSM is striking. Indeed, that QSM is able to so substantially connect the microworld with the macroworld is surely part of what has
motivated so many practitioners to conclude that at least some of the foundational problems that have plagued ordinary quantum mechanics may be
solved by moving further down these paths. The ability of a quantum system to treat macroscopic systems as though they were inﬁnite may suggest
that it is best to ﬁnd a different quantum theory in which macroscopic
systems really are inﬁnite. As luck would have it, just such a theory is
readily available in the guise of quantum ﬁeld theory. In quantum ﬁeld
theory, operators are deﬁned at geometric points on a ﬁeld, and thus there
is a strict inﬁnity of property-bearing points. The present analysis may be
taken to suggest, then, that, though the success of QSM fails to lend credence to a quantum statistical foundation of emergent phenomena, it may
10. At least insofar as it uses the thermodynamic limit as it does in accounts of phase
transition. Such appeals, however, are endemic to QSM, and very frequently fall afoul of the
argument of this paper, mutatis mutandis.
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point in the direction of a quantum ﬁeld theoretic foundation of the
very same phenomena. Of course, this is far from a trivial project, in
part because the thermodynamic limit now must face the substantial
task of renormalization with its well-known interpretive challenges,
and it is thus far beyond the scope of this paper. I mention it merely
to indicate a ﬁnal, positive role that disconﬁrming ﬁctions may have:
their failure to be fully conﬁrmed by their success can suggest that
perhaps they may be conjoined with a different theoretical framework
within which they are less ﬁctional.
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